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NOTES
REVOCATION OF TRUSTS BY CONSENT OF THE BENEFICIARIES
The settlor of an inter vivos trust generally cannot revoke it unless
he has reserved in the trust instrument a power of revocation.' A well
recognized exception occurs, however, where all persons who have a
"beneficial interest" in the trust give their consent that the settlor can
revoke the trust even though the instrument declares that the trust shall
be irrevocable.' This exception, called the consent rule, is derived from
the English common-law and has been adopted throughout most of the
United States3 whenever the question of revocation of a trust by the con-
sent of the beneficiaries has arisen. Generally, when a settlor has granted
property rights he cannot resume his former status merely because he
later decides his disposition was unwise.4 But if the settlor and all the
beneficiaries no longer wish the trust to be continued, there is no reason
for the court to insist that its terms be carried out.5
The rule is simple enough as stated, but courts have experienced con-
siderable difficulty in determining who are persons beneficially interested.
The courts have generally assumed that these persons are to be deter-
mined solely by application of the rules of conveyancing pertaining to
the existence of a property interest. Thus, any property interest is a
"beneficial interest" whether vested or contingent, immediate or remote.
Although the consent rule was at first rejected in New York,' this
trend was reversed by statute.' Subsequent New York cases held, on the
1. 3 ScoTr, TRuSTS §§ 330, 338 (2d ed. 1956); Scott, Revoking a Trust: Recent
Legislative Simplification, 65 HARV. L. REv. 617 (1952).
2. 3 Scoir, TRUSTS §§ 337, 340 (2d ed. 1956).
3. Ibid.
4. Allen v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 177 Md. 26, 7 A.2d 180 (1939) ; Price v.
Price, 162 Md. 656, 161 AtI. 2 (1932); 4 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 993 (1948).
5. 3 ScoTT, op. cit. supra note 2, § 338.
6. Mabie v. Bailey, 95 N.Y. 206 (1884) ; Note, Revocation of Inter Vivos Trusts,
26 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 201 (1951).
7. N. Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 23, provides:
Upon the written consent of all persons beneficially interested in a
trust in personal property or any part thereof heretofore or here-
after created, the creator of such trust may revoke the same as to
the whole or such part thereof, and thereupon the estate of the
trustee shall cease in the whole of such part thereof.
and N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 118 contains a similar provision, thereby codifying the
common-law rule previously not followed in New York. Scott, supra note 1, at 618;
Mariash, Revocation of Inter Vivos Trusts in New York-A Study in Confusion, 16
BRoo0xLYN L. REv. 41 (1950). The statute "neither enlarges nor restricts the class of
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basis of statutory construction, that only the consent of beneficially in-
terested persons in being was necessary to revoke a trust.' This position
was obviously judicial legislation and has remained a minority rule.
Nevertheless, the need for this qualification is apparent,9 and cases can
be found that have applied the New York rule where no similar statute
was involved."0
Where beneficiaries are designated by name, the courts find prop-
erty interests and there can be no revocation without the consent of the
named holders. However, the typical gift of principal following an in-
come trust is usually to a class rather than to named individuals." When
the persons who are given future interests in a trust are not designated
by name, but by class, such as: children, issue, heirs or next of kin, dif-
ficult problems in ascertaining persons beneficially interested arise which
have not been handled uniformly by the courts. The chief characteristic
of a class gift is that it is a gift to a group of persons which can increase
or decrease in membership after the execution of the instrument which
creates the gift.' When the membership of the group is ascertained at
those answering the description of persons 'beneficially interested in a trust.'" Robinson
v. New York Life Ins. & Trust Co., 75 Misc. 361, 366 (N.Y. Spec. Term 1912); Note,
7 N.Y.L. REv. 42 (1949).
8. Smith v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 287 N.Y. 500, 41 N.E. 2d 72 (1942) ; Kuntze
v. Guaranty Trust Co., 248 App. Div. 871, 290 N.Y. Supp. 812 (1st Dep't 1936); Cram v.
Walker, 173 App. Div. 804, 160 N.Y. Supp. 486 (1st Dep't 1916). Not only do unborn
remaindermen have no rights, but a child en ventre sa inere at the time revocation is
sought is not a person beneficially interested in a trust. Matter of Peabody, 5 N.Y.
2d 541, 158 N.E.2d 841 (1959) ; Matter of Ranger, 15 Misc. 2d 754, 184 N.Y. Supp. 677
(Spec. Term 1952); Note, N.Y.L.F. 322 (1959).
9. The harshness of using conveyancing concepts to ascertain persons beneficially
interested in a trust is illustrated in a Kentucky case, Underhill v. United States Trust
Co., 227 Ky. 444, 13 S.W.2d 706 (1950). The settlor conveyed real estate in trust with
the income to be paid to herself during her life. She reserved the power to appoint the
recipient of the corpus by will, but in the event of default of appointment, the trust was
to continue and the income was to go to her daughter for life. Upon the daughter's death
the corpus was to go to those whom she appointed by will, or upon failure to appoint,
to the daughter's children. It was held that the settlor, who was seventy, in ill health
and also in bad financial straits, and her only daughter who was forty years old, divorced
and had never had any children, could not themselves revoke the trust since possible
beneficiaries yet unborn could not consent. The court based its decision on the ill
founded conclusive presumption that everyone may have children born to them so long
as they live, regardless of age, sex, or physical condition. The rule is supported on the
grounds that a contrary result would violate public policy by fostering perjury and
illegal operations. Byers v. Beddow, 106 Fla. 166, 142 So. 894 (1932) ; Note, 46 YALE
L.J. 1005, 1017 (1937). See also In re Burchell's Estate, 299 N.Y. 351, 87 N.E. 2d 293
(1949).
10. Dunnett v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 184 Okla. 82, 85 P.2d 281 (1938);
Bottimore v. First & Merchants Nat'l Bank, 170 Va. 221, 196 S.E. 593 (1938). Despite
these cases, Prof. Scott stated: "An opposite rule would obtain in the absence of statute."
Scott, supra note 1, at 621, citing 3 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 340 (1st ed. 1939) (himself) as
authority.
11. GuLLivER, CASES ON FUTURE INTERESTS 83 (1959).
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the designated future time, each member takes an equal portion of the
property." Thus, until the class future interest vests in possession at
the designated time such persons are unascertainable and may be unborn.
Yet it has been held that those who take under a class gift are persons
beneficially interested in a trust whose consent is required for its revoca-
tion. Therefore, under these circumstances, it is impossible for the
settlor to revoke the trust since he cannot obtain the consent of all per-
sons having a beneficial interest in the trust.
In one common situation the settlor grants property in trust, income
to himself or some third person for life, and on termination of the life
estate the corpus to be turned over to a designated person if then living,
but if such person is dead, to his children, issue, heirs or next of kin.
Where the gift over is to the children or issue of the specifically identi-
fied beneficiary, it has been consistently held in most states that an in-
terest in remainder has been created in such persons.14 Where the gift
over is to the heirs or next of kin (or words of like import) authorities
are split." One line of cases finds that the interest created in such pres-
ently unascertainable persons is a remainder, vested or contingent, so that
the consent of such persons is necessary to revocation of the trust. Other
cases conclude that the settlor has granted away the entire interest to the
prior designated beneficiary leaving no interests in others, and there-
fore not requiring the consent of anyone else. The problem becomes one
of the application of rules of property law, and rules of construction to
determine the intent of the settlor. If a property interest is found, the
holder is beneficially interested within the consent rule. 6
To establish the settlor's intent as to who are persons beneficially
interested in the trust whose consent is required for its revocation, var-
ious tests are used by the courts. One such test is the Rule in Shelley's
Case, an ancient rule of feudal origin and policy, which declares that apt
words which indisputably create a remainder in the heirs of a life tenant
should be held as a limitation of the estate which the grantee takes, the
remainderman being thus cut off and taking nothing.' Originally, the
12. SIaES, FUTURE INTERESTS § 90 (1936).
13. GULLIVER, op. cit. supra note 11, at 84; 1 JARMAN, WILLS § 232 (6th Am. ed.
1893) ; Cooley, What Constitutes a Gift to a Class, 49 HARV. L. REV. 903, 925 (1936).
14. ,-iurt v. Gilmer, 40 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1930) ; Byers v. Beddow, 106 Fla. 166,
142 So. 894 (1932) ; Underhill v. United States Trust Co., 227 Ky. 444, 13 S.W.2d 706
(1950); King v. York Trust Co., 278 Pa. 141, 122 Atl. 227 (1923); RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND), TRUSTS § 127, comment d (1959) ; Scott, supra note 1, at 620; Note, 46 YALE
L.J. 1005, 1017 (1937). But cf. text accompanying notes 8-10 supra.
15. 3 SCOTT, op. cit. supra note 2, § 340; ScoTT, supra note 1, at 620.
16. Allen v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 177 Md. 26, 7 A.2d 180 (1939).
17. Gray v. Union Trust Co., 171 Cal. 637, 154 Pac. 306 (1915).
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Rule was a rule of law which applied only to grants of interests in realty,"
and only when both the life estate and the remainder interest were of the
same quality-both legal or both equitable. 9  Later, the courts extended
the Rule in many cases to dispositions of personal property.2" Most of
these later decisions, however, treat it as a rule of construction which will
yield to the clear intention of the settlor.21
In Botzum v. Havana Nat'l Bank2" the settlor transferred property
in trust, income to his wife for life and on her death as she should by
will appoint, and in default of appointment to two named persons, or if
either of them should be dead to his "heirs at law." A suit was brought
by the settlor and his wife to revoke the trust. The designated remain-
dermen appeared and consented to the revocation. In allowing revoca-
tion of the trust the court held that the heirs of the designated remainder-
men in co-tenancy were not beneficiaries of the trust, since the words
"heirs at law" were words of limitation and not words of purchase.
The case does not fit the fact situation permitting application of the
Rule in Shelley's Case since the gift to the heirs did not follow a life
estate, but a vested remainder. Thus, it appears that the court extended
the Rule2' in the trust area in an era of its general decline in the wills and
conveyancing area.
In an Oklahoma decision, Dunnett v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co.,24 the court allowed revocation of a trust by consent of the benefici-
aries where there was an alternative gift over to the issue of the principal
remainderman. The court construed the word "issue" to be like "heirs,"
a word of limitation and not of purchase. 25  The Dunnett case has then
resulted in a further extension of the words of purchase versus the words
of limitation test of the settlor's intent. Where the Botzum case extended
the application of the test to find that the heirs of a vested remainderman
18. It re Trusteeship of Creech, 159 N.E.2d 291, 296 (Ind. App. 1959) ; Siceloff v.
Redman's Adm'r, 26 Ind. 251 (1866); Sands v. Old Colony Trust Co., 195 Mass. 575,
81 N.E. 300 (1907).
19. Sutliff v. Aydelott, 373 Ii. 633, 27 N.E.2d 529 (1940); Note, 35 ILL. L. REv.
590 (1941).
20. Sands v. Old Colony Trust Co., 195 Mass. 575, 81 N.E. 300 (1907). In
Mississippi, a statute repealing the Ride was held to have affected only its application to
real estate, leaving it in force as to personal property. Carradine v. Carradine, 33 Miss.
698 (1857). In most states today the Rule in Shelley's Case has been completely abolished.
See 2 ScoT, op. cit. supra note 2, § 127.2, and statutes cited therein.
21. Sands v. Old Colony Trust Co., supra note 20; GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST
PERPETUITES § 647 n.3 (4th ed. 1942).
22. 367 Ill. 539, 12 N.E.2d 203 (1937).
23. The Ride in Shelley's Case was abolished in Illinois on January 1, 1953. 11.
Ann. Stat. § 30-186 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1959).
24. 184 Okla. 82, 85 P.2d 281 (1938).
25. Accord, Hurst v. Taubman, 275 P.2d 877 (Okla. 1954).
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took by descent and not by purchase, the Dunizett case applying the test
to a gift over to the "issue" of a remainderman came to the same result.
The decision was unorthodox but was based on the settlor's intent as
found in the purpose clause of the trust instrument which stated that the
primary purpose of the settlors in creating the trust was to provide an
income for themselves for their respective lives and to educate and main-
tain their son, rather than to dispose of their estate as if creating a testa-
mentary trust. The court also relied on the New York rule that only
the consent of persons in being was required for revocation and since the
principal remainderman was unmarried and had no issue at that time,
the consent of such issue was unnecessary.
The Botaum and Dunnett cases were cited as authority by the federal
district court in Randall v. Randall" for the position that contingent
beneficiaries were not necessary parties to an action for the revocation
of a trust. The remainder interest in an income trust, which was to ter-
minate on the settlor's death, was to be divided among the survivors of
the settlor's five named children and the issue of deceased children, per
stirpes. If a deceased child had no issue, his share was to go to the re-
maining children or their issue, per stirpes. It was held that the imme-
diate parties to the trust instrument could, by mutual consent, revoke it
and that persons having no vested interest under the trust had no ground
for complaint. The court in the Randall case squarely adopted the un-
orthodox decision of the Dunnett case.
Where the settlor grants property in trust, income to himself or
some third person for life, and on termination of the life estate the corpus
to be distributed to the settlor's children, issue, heirs or next of kin, the
courts have found that the interest created in such presently unascertain-
able persons is either a remainder, vested or contingent, so that the con-
sent of such persons is necessary to revocation of the trust, or merely a
reversionary interest retained by the settlor in himself, leaving no in-
terest in others." In such a situation the Rule in Shelley's Case should
have no application. The Rule applies only to a conveyance where the
heirs named are those of some third person to whom the life estate is con-
26. 60 F. Supp. 308 (S.D. Fla. 1944).
27. Where the gift over is to the children or issue of the settlor, it has been con-
sistently held in most jurisdictions that an interest in remainder has been created in such
persons. Allen v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 177 Md. 26, 7 A.2d 180 (1939) ; RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 127 (1959) ; Scott, supra note 1, at 620. But cf. text accom-
panying notes 8-10 supra. In Bottimore v. First & Merchants Nat'l Bank, 170 Va. 221,
196 S.E. 593 (1938) the court held that a gift over in default of appointment by will
to the settlor's "children" was in effect, merely a gift to her possible heirs or next of
kin, and therefore they were not "persons beneficially interested" in the trust whose
consent was required to revoke it.
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veyed-not where there is no conveyance of a life estate but mere reten-
tion of one.28
When the settlor conveys property in trust for himself for life, and
retains a power of appointment by deed or will, then to his heirs or next
of kin in default of appointment, the inference arises from the general
power that he intends to remain the sole beneficiary of the trust, and
does not intend to create any other interests by the instrument.2 9 But,
when the settlor reserves a power to appoint by will only, there is "some
indication that he intended to make his 'heirs' or 'next of kin' benefici-
aries of the trust and to confer an interest on them of which they cannot
be deprived except by a testamentary appointment."" On pure property
notions, when a settlor has a life estate coupled with a power of appoint-
ment by deed or will, there is no interest in the property which he does
not have; but when the settlor lacks the power to appoint by deed, his
interests are not so much like that of a fee owner and the alternative gift
to heirs seems, therefore, to take on substance. But even where a settlor
reserves to himself the power to appoint by will only, this should not in-
dicate that he intended that his heirs would have to consent to his dis-
cretion to revoke the trust had he thought about it, despite that on pure
property notions the heirs take a property interest in the trust. As a
practical man the settlor knows the heirs will take nothing unless he per-
mits them-he has the power to defeat their interest.
Another rule for ascertaining the settlor's intent is the Doctrine of
Vorthier Title. 1  Under this rule, "an inter vivos conveyance for life,
with an attempted remainder to the heirs or next of kin of the conveyor,
is ineffective to create a remainder, but leaves a reversion in the con-
veyor. "32 The Doctrine of Worthier Title is used most often today to
28. Dreyer v. Lange, 74 Ariz. 39, 243 P.2d 468 (1952); Doctor v. Hughes, 225 N.Y.
305, 122 N.E. 221 (1919) ; 35 ILL. L. REv. 590, 594 (1941); 34 ILL. L. REv. 379 (1940).
29. Dreyer v. Lange, supra note 28.
30. Allen v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 177 Md. 26, 30, 7 A.2d 180 (1939) ; McKenna
v. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 214 P.2d 664 (Wash. 1950); RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
TRUSTS § 127 (1959) ; RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 314, comment a (1940). But cf. Botti-
more v. First & Merchants Nat'l Bank, 170 Va. 221, 196 S.E. 593 (1938).
31. Discussed here is the inter vivos branch of the Doctrine, which might be best
dcsignated as "the rule against a remainder to the grantor's heirs." McKenna v. Seattle-
First Nat'l Bank, supra note 30; Morris, The Inter Vivos Branch of the Worthier Title
Doctrine, 2 OKLA. L. REv. 133 (1949) ; Warren, A Remainder to the Grantor's Heirs,
22 TEXAS L. REv. 22 (1943). This is to be distinguished from the early common-law
rule that if a man devised land to his heirs, the heirs took by inheritance rather than as
devisees. The heirs undoubtedly took the property, the only question was as to how they
took it, by devise or descent (which is unimportant today). Scott, supra note 1, at 619.
32. McKenna v. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, supra note 30; Note, 44 DIcK. L. Rxv.
247 (1939). The question then is not by what title the heir takes, but whether he takes
any title at all by the conveyance. See RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 314 (1940) ; RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 127, comment b (1959) ; SImEs, op. cit. supra note 12, § 144.
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enable a settlor to revoke an inter vivos trust, which by its terms is ir-
revocable." The impetus for this was provided by a New York case not
concerned with revocation, Doctor v. Hughes,4 which involved a trust
created to pay the income to the settlor for life and on his death to convey
the corpus to the settlor's "heirs' at law." Applying the Doctrine of
Worthier Title, the court held that the grantor had retained a reversion
which the heirs would take by descent, if at all. The instrument, thus,
gave them no interest by purchase which could be reached by their credi-
tors. The court said that it is a positive rule of our law that "a man can-
not either by a conveyance at common law, by limitation of uses, or by
devise, make his right heir a purchaser."35  The heirs have a mere ex-
pectancy. The court found that there was
no adequate disclosure of a purpose in the settlor's mind to vest
presumptive heirs with rights which would be beyond his power
to defeat. . . . [S]eldom do the living forego power of dispo-
sition during life by a direction that upon death there shall be
a transfer to 'heirs' . . . . [T]o transform into a remainder
what would ordinarily be a reversion, the intention to work
the transformation must be clearly expressed. 6
The direction to the trustee to transfer the corpus to the settlor's heirs at
the termination of the trust was a "superfluous expression of a duty im-
posed by law.""
In 1929 the New York Court of Appeals in Whittemore v. Equitable
Trust Co. 8 was faced with the same question but in the context of a trust
revocation. The Appellate Division,"5 citing Doctor v. Hughes, had held
that under the common-law doctrine, the settlors' creation of a gift over
to their heirs conveyed no rights by purchase, pointing out that there was
no intent by the settlors to give in any manner other than as the property
would pass in case of intestacy. The Court of Appeals in reversing held
that a gift over to the same persons who would take by intestacy from
the settlors created a vested remainder, and although unobtainable the
consent of the heirs was required to revoke the trust, since they were
33. GULLIVER, op. cit. supra note 11, at 94.
34. 225 N.Y. 305, 122 N.E. 221 (1919).
35. 225 N.Y. at 310.
36. Id. at 313. This view is adopted in RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 314(1) and
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 127, comment b.
37. 225 N.Y. at 309.
38. 250 N.Y. 298, 165 N.E. 454 (1929).
39. 223 App. Div. 693, 229 N.Y. Supp. 440 (1st Dep't 1928).
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"persons beneficially interested" therein.4" The court completely ignored
the settled distinction between the Rude in Shelley's Case (which was
abolished in New York by statute) and the Doctrine of Worthier Title
that was so meticulously pointed out by Justice Cardozo in Doctor v.
Hughes.41 Although the court did not so hold, it is apparent that the
statutory abrogation of the Rule in Shelley's Case was interpreted to
eliminate, by implication, the Doctrine of Worthier Title also. Such a
position is defensible in regard to the Rule in Shelley's Case and the Doc-
trine of Worthier Title as literal property rules of law to determine who
takes an interest in the property, but it should not be allowed to affect
the problem of whose consent is required to revoke a conveyance in trust,
which is strictly a matter of the settlor's subjective intent.
The decision in the Whittemore case rested on a California case,
Gray v. Union. Trust Co.,42 in which there was a gift over to the settlor's
heirs in default of appointment. The court regarded the "heirs' " inter-
est as a future interest which, being dependent on a precedent freehold
estate, was a remainder. The decision was supported and rationalized
on the basis of the abrogation of the Rule in Shelley's Case, which was
not applicable.2 The Doctrine of Worthier Title was not mentioned in
the opinion perhaps because counsel did not argue it. Its chance of suc-
cess, had it been argued, is clearly indicated in a much later decision,
Bixby v. California Trust Co.," handed down by the same court, which
impliedly overrules the Gray case. The Bixby case held the rule of Doc-
tor v. Hughes squarely applied, and justified the rule on the theory that
it carried out the usual intention of the settlor as to who was to take an
interest, and applied unless a contrary intent was manifested.4" The
court stated that such a rule of construction was in accord with the
40. The Court of Appeals in reversing the Appellate Division did what was
wholly unprecedented, and resulted in twenty years of confusion as to the state of the
law in New York until it was finally settled by legislative enactment in 1951, which
provided that for purposes of revocation of a trust, heirs, next of kin, or descendants
took no interest which would require their consent. Mariash, supra note 7. The 1951
amendments to N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 23 and N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 118 (N.Y.
Laws 1951, c. 180) sodified and broadened the rules of Doctor v. Hughes, 225 N.Y.
305, 122 N.E. 221 (1919) and Smith v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 287 N.Y. 500, 41 N.E.2d
72 (1942). Note, 26 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 678, 683 (1951).
41. It is interesting to note that Justice Cardozo also sat on the bench and concurred
in Judge Crane's opinion in the Whittemore case. Judge Pound also sat on both benches
and concurred in both decisions.
42. 171 Cal. 637, 154 Pac. 306 (1915).
43. The Ruie in Shelley's Case contemplates a remainder in the heirs of the grantee,
not the reservation of a future interest in the heirs of the grantor, as was the case here.
See text accompanying note 28 supra.
44. 33 Cal.2d 495, 202 P.2d 1018 (1949).
45. 1 Siz~iMs, FUTURE INTERESTS § 147 (1936).
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general policy of free alienability of property, since its operation tended
to make property more readily transferable.4"
In the intermediate appellate court47 it was urged that abrogation of
the Ride in Shelley's Case also, by implication, eliminated the Doctrine of
Worthier Title in California. The California Supreme Court's deci-
sion,4" although this particular argument was not specifically answered,
clearly rejected such a theory.4" A case" directly in point was cited by
the court in support of the decision."'
Other cases cited by the court as authority in the Bixby case indicate
that the Doctrine of Worthier Title has become a popular device for al-
lowing revocation of expressly irrevocable trusts. Two cases decided in
19232 and one in 1937,"3 in three different jurisdictions, came to the
same result without mentioning either Doctor v. Hughes or the Doctrine
of Worthier Title. In all three cases the issue was decided in an action
to revoke the trust and revocation was allowed. In Stephenis v. Moore"4
and Burton v. Boren,"3 the settlor, as recipient of the income for life, was
declared the sole beneficiary where there was a gift over of the corpus at
his death to his legal heirs. In Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Wil-
liams, 6 the settlor, by a trust agreement, gave $20,000 to a trustee to in-
vest, reserving the income to himself for life. At his death the income
was to go to B until he reached twenty-one years of age and at that time
B was to receive the corpus. If B predeceased the settlor there was a gift
over to the appointees of the settlor's will, but in default of appointment
to the settlor's "heirs at law." The settlor's heirs took nothing by pur-
chase under the trust instrument."7
46. See RESTATEmENT, PROPERTY § 314 (1940). The same result was reached in
the early common law as an outgrowth of the Doctrine of Worthier Title, which, for
reasons based on feudal law and having no counterpart in the modern law of property,
preferred the passage of title to heirs by descent rather than by purchase. 1 ScoTT,
TRUSTS 657 (1st ed. 1939) ; SIdlES, op. cit. supra note 45; Annot., 125 A.L.R. 553 (1940).
47. 190 P.2d 321 (Cal. App. 1948).
48. 33 Cal.2d 495, 202 P.2d 1018 (1949).
49. It has never been specifically held by any court that abrogation of the Rule
in Shelley's Case also, by implication, eliminated the Doctrine of Worthier Title.
GULLIVER, op. cit. supra note 11, at 96.
50. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Williams, 268 Ky. 671, 105 S.W.2d 814 (1937).
51. 202 P.2d at 1019.
52. Stephens v. Moore, 298 Mo. 215, 249 S.W. 601 (1923); Burton v. Boren, 308
Ill. 440, 139 N.E. 868 (1923).
53. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Williams, 268 Ky. 671, 105 S.W.2d 814 (1937).
54. 298 Mo. 215, 249 S.W. 601 (1923).
55. 308 Ill. 440, 139 N.E. 868 (1923).
56. 268 Ky. 671, 105 S.W.2d 814 (1937).
57. Accord, Beach v. Busey, 156 F.2 496 (6th Cir. 1946); Dreyer v. Lange, 74
Ariz. 39, 243 P.2d 468 (1952) ; Mancie v. Howard Say. Inst., 30 N.J. Super. 267, 104
A.2d 74 (Ch. 1954); Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Parfner, 135 N.J. Eq. 133, 37 A.2d
675 (1944); Hurst v. Taubman, 275 P.2d 877 (Okla. 1954); Dunnett v. First Nat'l
NOTES
In the context of common-law conveyancing concepts the cases thus
seem erroneous, confused, and irreconcilable. But in their true context
of trust revocation, they appear to be developing a refinement of the rule
that in the absence of a reserved power the settlor can revoke a trust only
with the consent of all persons beneficially interested. Weight is given
to the settlor's intent regarding whether a person should have such an
interest in the corpus that that person's consent would be necessary for
revocation."5 Emphasis is placed by the courts on the purpose clause of
the trust instrument, especially in the cases arising in the context of im-
personal class terminology." The New York rule,6" which has been
adopted in other states without the benefit of a statute,6 states that only
persons in being are persons beneficially interested in a trust and their
consent alone is required for its revocation. Thus, the twisting of ordi-
nary conveyancing rules can be explained on the basis that the courts are
considering factors which go to the quality of an interest within a frame-
work of rules which go to its existence. The Rule in Shelley's Case has
been extended to nullify an alternative gift over to the heirs of a remain-
derman; the word "issue" has been construed as a word of limitation and
not of purchase; and the concept of vested and contingent interests has
been strained in order to allow revocation of trusts which would other-
wise be impossible to revoke under the broad rule that the consent of all
persons with a property interest is required.
Both Doctor v. Huglies6 and Whittemore v. Equitable Trust Co.
speak of the settlor's intent but reach opposite results in applying the
Doctrine of Worthier Title to nearly identical trusts. But the ultimate
issues in the two cases were entirely different."4 In Doctor v. Hughes the
question was whether creditors of the heirs of the settlor could obtain a
lien on the interest under the trust, not whose consent was required for
Bank & Trust Co., 184 Okla. 82, 85 P.2d 281 (1938) ; McKenna v. Seattle-First Nat'l
Bank, 214 P.2d 664 (Wash. 1950); RESTATEIENT (SECOND), TRusTs § 127 (1959)
I ScoTr, TRUSTS 656 (1st ed. 1939) ; Annot., 125 A.L.R. 548-590.
58. Bixby v. California Trust Co., 33 Cal.2d 495, 202 P.2d 1018 (1949) ; McKenna
v. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, supra note 57.
59. Dunnett v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 184 Okla. 82, 85 P.2d 281 (1938).
60. See text accompanying notes 6-8 supra.
61. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
62. 225 N.Y. 305, 122 N.E. 221 (1919).
63. 250 N.Y. 298, 165 N.E. 454 (1929).
64. But cf. Davies v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 248 App. Div. 380, 288 N.Y.
Supp. 398 (1st Dep't 1936) and Beam v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 248 App.
Div. 182, 288 N.Y. Supp. 403 (1st Dep't 1936), two revocation cases decided by the same
court on the same day, May 29, 1936, involving substantially the same kind of trusts,
but in which the court reached opposite results. The former allowed revocation basing
its decision on Doctor v. Hughes; the latter denied revocation on the basis of the
Whittemore case.
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its revocation, as in the Whittemore case. In Doctor v. Hughes on credi-
tors' rights policies, application of the Doctrine of Worthier Title was a
ready way of denying creditors a lien on such a remote interest by deny-
ing its existence. But in the Whittemore case, because of the already ex-
istent revocation rules, the court could apply sound conveyancing prin-
ciples, avoiding the Doctrine of Worthier Title for that purpose. In
New York only persons in being were beneficially interested." Courts
in other states tend to follow Doctor v. Hughes and use the Doctrine of
Worthier Title in solving revocation problems in order to reach the result
otherwise obtained in New York that only the consent of beneficiaries
in being is necessary.
The New York rule states that a beneficiary must be in being at the
time revocation is sought to require his consent. The courts generally
have not gone beyond cutting off the consent of unborn or unascertained
beneficiaries. In Randall v. Randall,66 however, the court apparently cut
off contingent beneficiaries in esse, the children of the designated vested
remainderman. If these contingent beneficiaries were not in being when
the trust was created, 7 it would seem rational to believe that the settlor
would not then have thought their rights were such as to avoid defeat by
the then living parties. But the settlor must have intended to give the
contingent beneficiaries some interest; otherwise, he would not have
mentioned them at all. In third party beneficiary contracts, once the
beneficiary indicates his acceptance, the contract cannot be changed or
rescinded by the promisor and promisee without the beneficiary's con-
sent.68 When a beneficiary of a trust is born, we may presume his ac-
ceptance" and his consent to revocation or change becomes necessary.
Therefore, in cutting off in esse beneficiaries, the Randall case appears
unjustified on precedent and analogy.
The refinement of the rule that a settlor may revoke a trust only
with the consent of all persons beneficially interested, to include only such
persons in being at the time revocation is sought seems justified on three
bases: (1) The settlor, had he thought about it, would not have intended
to create in such unborn persons interests which were beyond the power
of the immediate parties to defeat. (2) The policy of the free aliena-
tion of property is further by the "in being" rule. (3) The main attri-
65. Smith v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 287 N.Y. 500, 41 N.E. 2d 72 (1942) ; Kuntze
v Guaranty Trust Co., 248 App. Div. 871, 290 N.Y. Supp. 812 (1st Dep't 1936) ; Cram
v. Walker, 173 App. Div. 804, 160 N.Y. Supp. 486 (1st Dep't 1916).
66. 60 F. Supp. 308 (S.D. Fla. 1944).
67. This seems to be a valid assumption since the trust was created twelve years
prior to the action for its revocation.
68. 12 Am. JuR., Contracts § 288 (1938) and cases cited therein.
69. 1 ScOrr, TRUSTS § 36 (2d ed. 1956).
NOTES
bute of the trust arrangement is that it is flexible, and this rule promotes
flexibility in the control and management of property.
On the other hand, the application of pure property concepts pro-
motes certainty and reliance. If the settlor creates vested or contingent
interests in others-his children, issue, heirs, next of kin, etc.-they are
persons beneficially interested in the trust and he cannot resume his
former status merely because he later decides his disposition was un-
wise." But where the consent rule is limited to persons in being at the
time of revocation, and not at the time of execution, neither certainty nor
reliance seem to be obstacles to its application. A trust has been said to
be in the nature of a conveyance of property interests and not a mere
contractual relation.71 But since it has its inception in a manifestation
of intention to create it, it has similarity to a contract;"2 and contract con-
cepts are involved in the trustee's relationships to the settlor and the
beneficiaries.73 The flexibility of the trust arrangement in the manage-
ment and distribution of property tends to rebut the view that it is like
an ordinary absolute conveyance to which conveyancing notions alone
should be strictly applied. The weight of precedent, however, makes the
legislature, rather than the courts, a more practical, if not necessary,
medium for reform because the present use of conveyancing rules is con-
ceptually difficult within the trust context.
THE COURT v. THE LEGISLATURE: RULE-MAKING POWER
IN INDIANA
Without specific constitutional authority the Indiana Supreme Court
has always prescribed rules to govern its functioning.' The power to
70. Allen v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 177 Md. 26, 7 A.2d 180 (1939) ; Price v.
Price, 162 Md. 656, 161 Atl. 2 (1932) ; 4 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 993 (1948).
71. 89 C.J.S., TRUSTS §§ 9, 63 (1955).
72. Scotr, op. cit. supra note 69, § 2.8.
73. Stephens v. Moore, 298 Mo. 215, 249 S.W. 601, 604 (1923).
1. WILmOUr & FLANAGAN, INDIANA PLEADING AND PROCEDURE (Supp. 1959, at
125). "The first rules were adopted in 1817." These were printed in the Indiana
Reports, 1, 4, Blackford's Reports; subsequent additions and revisions were printed in
1, 14, 22, 23, 26, 30, 32, 34, 36, 40, 43 and 49, Indiana Reports. The practice of publishing
the rules in the Indiana Reports was discontinued in 1889; rules for that year and for
1900, 1911, 1923, 1936, 1938, 1940, 1943, 1946, and 1949 were published in pamphlet form.
The revisions to the rules in 1954 and 1958 were published by WEST PUBLISHING
COMPANY. In 1940 the rules reappeared in the Indiana Reports (218 Ind.) and in the
Appellate Court Reports (108 Ind. App.) with the stipulation that they would be pub-
lished in those reports only when revisions had taken place since the last publication
of the rules.
